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alice bamford & donald mackenzie
COUNTERPERFORMATIVITY
On a late summer’s evening in 1956, the bbc’s Third Programme broadcast—in two 45-minute parts, separated by a gramophone recording of Ravel’s song cycle, Histoires naturelles—a talk on ‘Performative Utterances’ by J. L. Austin, 
Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. The term 
‘performative’ (which he admitted was ‘ugly’, even though it seems to 
have been he who coined it) signalled a crucial shortcoming in the posi-
tivist prejudice that ‘the sole interesting business . . . of any utterance is 
to be true or . . . false’. As Austin told his listeners, there are perfectly 
meaningful statements in ordinary language that are neither true nor 
false, utterances in which the speaker ‘is doing something’ rather than 
asserting something about a state of affairs external to the utterance—
performative utterances. Imagine, for instance: 
that in the course of a marriage ceremony I say, as people will, ‘I do’—
( . . . take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife) . . . [W]hen I say ‘I 
do’ . . . I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it.1
Austin’s attention to the performative has survived the eclipse of 
the Oxford ‘ordinary language philosophy’, of which he was a leader. 
Especially via Jacques Derrida—with his famous critique of the Austinian 
assumption of ‘the conscious presence of the intention of the speak-
ing subject in the totality of his speech act’2—and Judith Butler’s hugely 
influential theorization of gender, the idea of ‘performativity’ has become 
a pervasive reference point in the humanities and social sciences. 
‘Performativity’ has, for example, been employed by the French economic 
sociologist Michel Callon as a way of denoting the capacity of a math-
ematical model or other aspect of ‘economics’ (a term he understands 
in a very broad sense, far broader than just the academic discipline) to 
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be more than a representation of some external reality.3 A model can do 
things, just as an utterance in everyday speech can (albeit in quite a dif-
ferent way). Performativity is, for instance, a particularly pertinent issue 
for mathematical models in finance. When such a model escapes from 
the lecture theatres and pages of academic journals into the wild—when 
it starts being used by financial practitioners, regulators and so on—it 
can affect the very phenomena it purports to describe. 
Our argument is this: when analysing the effects of mathematical 
models on financial markets, attention ought to be paid not just to per-
formativity, but also to ‘counterperformativity’.4 Austin himself, and 
many of those who have drawn on his work (such as Pierre Bourdieu), 
have been sharply aware that, as Austin put it, more is involved in 
performativity than ‘the uttering of the words of the so-called performa-
tive’. (In the case of ‘I do’, for example, both partners must legally be 
free to marry, the ceremony must be conducted according to certain 
rules and by an authorized person, etc.) What Austin called ‘misfires’ 
or ‘infelicities’—‘the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion 
of [intended performative] utterances’—are commonplace.5 Indeed, 
for Derrida and Butler, apparent failure is intrinsic to performativity’s 
productivity: ‘a successful performative is necessarily an “impure” per-
formative’; ‘rupture or failure . . . characterizes every interstitial moment 
within iteration’; ‘breakdown [is] constitutive to the performative opera-
tion of producing naturalized effects’.6
1 J. L. Austin, ‘Performative Utterances’, in Austin, Philosophical Papers, J. O. 
Urmson and G. J. Warnock, eds, Oxford 1970, pp. 233, 235, emphasis in original. 
We take the details of the broadcast from the bbc’s listings in the Radio Times,  24 
August 1956, p. 43. 
2 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, in Derrida, Limited Inc, Gerald Graff, 
ed., Evanston, il 1988, p. 14.
3 See, for example, Michel Callon’s edited collection The Laws of the Markets, Oxford 
1998; and Callon, ‘What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is Performative?’ 
in Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu, eds, Do Economists Make 
Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, Princeton, nj 2007.
4 The term was coined by Donald MacKenzie in ‘The Big, Bad Wolf and the 
Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash and the Performativity of 
Economics’, Economy and Society, vol. 33, 2004. 
5 J. L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered 
at Harvard University in 1955, J. O. Urmson, ed., Oxford 1962, p. 14, emphasis in 
the original. 
6 Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’; Judith Butler, ‘Performative Agency’, Journal 
of Cultural Economy, vol. 3, no. 2, 2010, p. 152.
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What, then, is our neologism good for? How can we, a sociologist 
(MacKenzie) and a literary theorist (Bamford), use counterperforma-
tivity to analyse the operations of finance and the epistemology of 
mathematical modelling? Abstraction and empiricism are intertwined 
in the very notion of counterperformativity, making it a particularly use-
ful concept for our analysis of the curious ways in which models ‘fail’. 
Mathematical models are, after all, bricolage constructions inscribed 
with curdled utopias, with arms and with rights—so many scraps of 
social history.7 Misfires are all-pervasive in the application of mathemat-
ics to finance: markets seldom if ever behave exactly as posited by even 
the most sophisticated model. ‘Counterperformativity’, however, is more 
than a routine misfire. It is more than just what Michel Callon—as noted 
above, the pioneer of the application of ‘performativity’ to economic 
life—calls, in translating ‘counterperformativity’ into his terminology, 
the failure of agencements (loosely, arrangements of human beings and 
non-human entities that generate specific forms of agency) ‘to discipline 
and frame the entities that they assemble’.8 Counterperformativity is a 
very particular form of misfire, of unsuccessful framing, when the use 
of a mathematical model does not simply fail to produce a reality (e.g. 
market results) that is consistent with the model, but actively under-
mines the postulates of the model. The use of a model, in other words, 
can itself create phenomena at odds with the model. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, to anchor the discussion, we con-
sider the context and effects of what is arguably the twentieth century’s 
most influential mathematical model in finance, the Black–Scholes 
model of options, which was hugely important to the emergence from 
the 1970s onwards of giant-scale markets in financial derivatives. (A 
‘derivative’ is a financial instrument whose value depends upon the 
price or level of another ‘underlying’ instrument, such as a block of 
shares. We explain ‘options’, which are a type of derivative, below.) Then 
we take on the article’s main task, which is to sketch the beginnings 
of a typology of forms of the counterperformativity of mathematical 
models in finance. 
We identify three mechanisms of counterperformativity. The first is 
when the use of a model such as Black–Scholes in ‘hedging’ (trading 
7 MacKenzie, ‘An Equation and Its Worlds: Bricolage, Exemplars, Disunity and 
Performativity in Financial Economics’, Social Studies of Science, vol. 33, 2003. 
8 Callon, ‘What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is Performative?’, p. 323.
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the underlying instrument in a way designed to offset the derivative’s 
risk) alters the market in the underlying instrument in such a way as to 
undermine the model’s assumed price dynamics. Hedging might seem 
an undramatic use of a model, but our prime example here is the stock 
market crash of 19 October 1987, arguably the single specific moment 
of greatest danger for the us financial markets in the half century after 
the Second World War. The second mechanism of counterperformativity 
that we identify is when a model that has a regulatory function (public or 
private) is ‘gamed’ by financial practitioners taking self-interested actions 
that are informed by the model but again have the effect of undermin-
ing it. Our example here is the global banking crisis of 2007–08, beside 
which the 1987 crash seems minor. The third mechanism of counter-
performativity is what we call ‘deliberate counterperformativity’: the use 
of a model with the conscious goal of creating a world radically at odds 
with the world postulated by the model. Actors in finance are not usually 
‘model dopes’, blindly employing models, but can often anticipate what 
the effects of the use of a model will be. The case of this on which we 
focus involves a family of mathematical models advocated by the mav-
erick French mathematician, Benoit Mandelbrot, who stood opposed 
both to mainstream financial economics (such as the Black–Scholes 
model) and to the form of ‘modernist’ reasoning hegemonic in mid-
twentieth century mathematics.9 As we will see, the family of models in 
question was adopted precisely to reduce the chances of the world they 
posited becoming real.
The final part of the article—our conclusion—briefly considers the place 
of performativity and counterperformativity in the analysis of finance. 
Neither concept is a panacea; both can only be supplements to other 
forms of enquiry, including more traditional political economy. The 
concepts have the virtue, however, of extending the scope of enquiry to 
a crucial aspect of modern economic life: its shaping by mathematical 
models. In particular, the notion of ‘counterperformativity’ keeps alive 
a necessary tension in how this should be analysed. The analyst should 
focus not just on cases in which models mould the world in their image, 
but also attend to the possibility and consequences of models doing 
exactly the opposite. 
9 ‘Modernist mathematics’, in the most general terms, was the attempt to create a 
self-contained discipline, severed from empirical concerns and characterized by an 
abstract style, that could account for its own foundations without the crutches of 
philosophy. See Alice Bamford, Chalk and the Architrave: Mathematics and Modern 
Literature, PhD Thesis, Cambridge 2015. 
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There is now a large literature on performativity, which we cannot 
review here.10 However, one crucial preliminary clarification is in order. 
Critics of this burgeoning literature argue that using Austin’s word ‘per-
formative’, or even simply invoking his name, misleads when one is 
dealing with a topic such as the effects of mathematical models on mar-
kets; one critic has even suggested that Austin needs to be saved from 
MacKenzie.11 This latter (we hope light-hearted) formulation aside, we 
find ourselves entirely in agreement with a central point made by these 
critics. As Judith Butler notes, ‘financial theories . . . do not function as 
sovereign powers or as authoritative actors who make things happen by 
saying them’.12 For traders to use a model such as Black–Scholes is not 
like a medieval monarch making someone an outlaw by saying that they 
are an outlaw: no mathematical fiat. We are dealing here not with mat-
ters of the philosophy of language, not with ‘acts [that] are constituted’ by 
utterances, but with causal effects.13 As such, what follows is historical 
social science, not philosophy, and it is therefore inevitably somewhat 
tentative. Teasing out causal pathways in complex sequences of events 
is not straightforward, and the need for brevity means that the relevant 
evidence is at best sketched rather than laid out in full.14 
What can a model do? 
That a mathematical model of option prices should have had any major 
effects at all is, in one sense, quite surprising, since the question of how 
10 Among important recent contributions to the study of performativity in eco-
nomic life are: Fabian Muniesa, The Provoked Economy: Economic Reality and the 
Performative Turn, London 2014; Ivan Boldyrev and Ekaterina Svetlova, eds, Enacting 
Dismal Science: New Perspectives on the Performativity of Economics, New York 2016; 
and Svetlova, Financial Models and Society: Villains or Scapegoats, London 2018.
11 Uskali Mäki, ‘Performativity: Saving Austin from MacKenzie’, in Karakostas and 
Dieks, eds, epsa11: Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 
Dordrecht 2013.
12 Butler, ‘Performative Agency’, p. 152.
13 Mäki, ‘Performativity’, p. 447, emphasis in original.
14 More detail on the episodes discussed here can be found in: MacKenzie, An 
Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, Cambridge, ma 2006; 
MacKenzie, ‘The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge’, 
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 116, no. 6, 2011; MacKenzie and Taylor Spears, 
‘“The Formula That Killed Wall Street”: The Gaussian Copula and Modelling 
Practices in Investment Banking’, Social Studies of Science, vol. 44, no. 3, 2014; 
MacKenzie and Spears, ‘“A Device for Being Able to Book p&l”: The Organizational 
Embedding of the Gaussian Copula’, Social Studies of Science, vol. 44, no. 3, 2014.
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options should be priced had long seemed an intriguing but essentially 
minor issue. Options had been traded for centuries, but typically in only 
an informal, semi-organized way—in the interstices or on the peripher-
ies of mainstream financial markets, and often in quiet violation of legal 
bans on options trading: options were often felt to be little better than 
wagers. The reason for that suspicion can be seen by considering one 
of the main classes of option: call options. A call option gives its holder 
the right to buy a given quantity of an underlying asset (a block of a 
hundred shares, for example) at a set price on, or up to, a given future 
date. Optimistic speculators might, for instance, be anticipating that the 
shares were going to rise in value, but simply buying those shares out-
right would be expensive. A call option can typically be purchased for 
a small fraction of the price of the shares. Just as in betting on a horse 
race, the gain can be considerable, but if the anticipated price rise does 
not happen, the option’s purchaser simply loses whatever she has paid 
for the option. 
While those who sell options (who ‘write’ them, in the terminology of 
the business) were and are usually professionals, purchasers of options 
were often laypeople. Prior to the events discussed below, the characteris-
tics of options were not normally standardized, and—since the prices of 
options with different parameters are difficult to compare—the vendors 
of options were therefore often not under much competitive pressure.15 
Judged by the standards of the option-pricing theory we are about to 
discuss, options were typically grossly overpriced.16 How options ought 
to be priced has, in any case, no intuitively clear answer. For many years 
there had been sporadic work on the problem, most famously by the 
French mathematician Louis Bachelier (1870–1946), now regarded as 
a precursor of modern mathematical finance. What has become the 
canonical solution was reached at the end of the 1960s by the American 
economists Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, and their derivation of 
their model was refined (and given what is essentially its current form) 
15 See, for example, Lyndon Moore and Steve Juh, ‘Derivative Pricing 60 Years 
Before Black–Scholes: Evidence from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’, Journal of 
Finance, vol. 66, no. 6, 2006. As Moore and Juh point out, the situation in the text 
can be found in more recent options markets too, not just in the past.
16 In modern terminology, the ‘implied volatility’ of these options greatly exceeded 
‘realized volatility’. See, for example, the historical study by Scott Mixon, ‘Option 
Markets and Implied Volatility: Past Versus Present’, Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 94, 2009.
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by their mit colleague, Robert C. Merton. The trio, especially Scholes 
and Merton, were firmly within the mainstream of the emergent aca-
demic specialism of financial economics, and by the time of their work 
the specialism’s centrepiece was already in place: the famous ‘efficient 
market hypothesis’, according to which prices in mature financial mar-
kets always reflect all publicly available information.17
Black, Scholes and Merton modelled option pricing by assuming, quite 
counterfactually, that options markets already were efficient. They 
made a set of simplifying assumptions of the kind common in finan-
cial economics, such as that options and shares could be bought and 
sold without incurring fees or other transaction costs in so doing. Their 
underlying model of share-price movements was also standard: they 
assumed that those movements followed a ‘random walk’ in which price 
changes in successive time periods were independent of each other. In 
particular, they adopted the most common version of this assumption, 
known as the ‘lognormal random walk’, where the word ‘normal’ refers 
to statisticians’ famous bell-shaped curve—the ‘normal’ or ‘Gaussian’ 
distribution—in which the frequency of large deviations from the aver-
age (and thus, in the case of finance, the probability of extreme price 
movements) is very low.18 
On this standard foundation, Black, Scholes and Merton built an ele-
gant and mathematically sophisticated model. Merton, in particular, had 
already started to pioneer the use of what has subsequently become the 
dominant form of mathematics in today’s derivatives markets, the sto-
chastic calculus developed by the Japanese mathematician, Kiyosi Itô 
(1915–2008); it is among the ironies of today’s us-dominated financial 
system that crucial parts of its mathematical foundations were laid in 
17 See, especially, Eugene Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work’, Journal of Finance, vol. 25, 1970. Black, a fascinating figure, 
was more ambivalently placed in regard to the mainstream, as shown in the fine 
biography by Perry Mehrling, Fischer Black and the Revolutionary Idea of Finance, 
New York 2005.
18 ‘Gaussian’ is simply the statistician’s term for the bell-shaped ‘normal’ distribu-
tion: Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777–1855) was a crucial contributor to the theory of this 
distribution. The ‘log’ in ‘lognormal’ refers to the modification that financial econo-
mists had adopted to ensure that on the standard model there was no possibility 
of share prices becoming negative, which never happens in today’s legal systems 
because the owners of shares enjoy limited liability: they cannot lose more than 
whatever they have paid for those shares. 
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a Japan locked into a catastrophic war with the United States. Black, 
Scholes and Merton showed that, given their framework of assump-
tions, it is possible to ‘replicate’ an option perfectly—to, in other words, 
construct a continuously adjusted portfolio of the underlying shares 
(and borrowing or lending of cash) that will have the same returns as the 
option in all states of the world: in other words, in any scenario within 
the scope of their assumptions. A trading position that consists of an 
option ‘hedged with’ (i.e. its risks exactly counterbalanced by) this ‘rep-
licating portfolio’ is in their model therefore riskless, and so—following 
‘efficient market’ logic—that position can earn no more, and no less, 
than what financial economists call ‘the riskless rate of interest’. (While 
that latter rate is a mathematical abstraction, a reasonable empirical 
approximation to it is provided by the rates of return offered by sover-
eign securities issued by a major government, such as that of the United 
States, in its own currency.)
This argument—the Merton-inflected derivation of the Black–Scholes 
model (whose authors had originally reached that model by more ad hoc 
routes)—swept aside much of the complication of many earlier models 
of option prices. For example, the argument relies not on the logic of 
speculation, on investors’ hopes for price rises or fears of price falls, but 
on the logic of arbitrage: the premise that two things that are worth the 
same (in other words, entitlements to cash flows that will be identical in 
all states of the world) must, in an efficient market, have exactly the same 
price, for if they do not savvy traders will instantly step in to exploit the 
discrepancy (and in competing to exploit it, will eliminate it). The combi-
nation of this conceptual simplicity and the mathematical tractability of 
the underlying random-walk model (Itô’s most famous result, known as 
‘Itô’s lemma’, can be brought into play) makes the Black–Scholes model 
far simpler cognitively than it at first appears. While earlier mathemati-
cal models of option prices often had multiple parameters that could be 
fitted to empirical data only with difficulty, the Black–Scholes model has 
only one ‘free parameter’, as a mathematician would put it: the ‘volatil-
ity’ (extent of price fluctuations) of the underlying shares. Everything 
else is either measurable reasonably directly, such as the riskless rate of 
interest, or ruled irrelevant by the strong assumptions and parsimoni-
ous logic of the underlying argument. 
Here, it is straightforward to see why those who are strictly faithful to 
Austin criticize ‘performativity’ analyses in finance. The world postulated 
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by Black, Scholes and Merton was not brought into being by their utter-
ance: the publication, in 1973, of their model.19 Take, for example, the 
apparently mundane but actually crucial matter of transaction costs. 
Itô’s mathematics was stochastic calculus, the mathematics of processes 
that take place in continuous time, and in which chance events such 
as changes in prices happen in any time interval, no matter how short. 
If transaction costs are not literally zero, continuous hedging would be 
infinitely expensive, and thus entirely infeasible. Certainly, transaction 
costs have fallen considerably since 1973, but not to zero, and the effects 
of the Black–Scholes model are at most one factor in this fall. 
Furthermore, Black, Scholes and Merton were also simply young 
economists, who lacked most of the normal sources of authority, even 
within their own profession. Black and Scholes, for example, had dif-
ficulty persuading the Journal of Political Economy to publish the paper 
that eventually led Scholes (and Merton) to Stockholm and the 1997 
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel: understandably, given the marginality of options to the finan-
cial system at the start of the 1970s, the journal’s editor regarded their 
paper as of only limited interest.20 Nor did traders have any automatic 
faith in the correctness of the Black–Scholes model. Mathew Gladstein, 
of the investment bank Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, was one of the 
first traders (perhaps the first trader) to use their model: he had con-
tracted with Scholes and Merton to provide him with theoretical options 
prices ready for the opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(discussed in more detail below) on 26 April 1973. ‘[T]he first day that 
the Exchange opened’, he recalled, the prices of the call options traded 
on it were 30–40 per cent higher than the model’s outputs. Gladstein’s 
first thought was not that the market was wrong, but that Scholes 
and Merton were: ‘I called Myron [Scholes] in a panic and said, “Your 
model is a joke.”’21
19 Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, ‘The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 81, 1973; Robert C. Merton, ‘Theory 
of Rational Option Pricing’, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 
vol. 4, 1973.
20 Robert Gordon, ‘Letter to Fischer Black’, 24 November 1970, Fischer Black 
Papers, Institute Archives and Special Collections, mit, box 13, Journal of Political 
Economics [sic] file. Black had died in 1995, and the Riksbank prize is never 
awarded posthumously. 
21 Mathew Gladstein, interviewed by MacKenzie, New York, 15 November 1999.
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That day’s events, however, marked the start of a process in which the 
Black–Scholes model did indeed influence financial markets, even if, as 
we have noted, determining precise causality is difficult or impossible. 
Scholes and Merton checked, and Scholes phoned Gladstein back, con-
vincing him that ‘The model’s right’, and that there was thus a wonderful 
opportunity to make money selling overpriced options. ‘I ran down the 
hall’, said Gladstein, and ‘I said “Give me more money [ for trading] and 
we are going to have a killing ground here.”’
The first effect of the model on which we will focus is the most clear-
cut: its effect on how professional options traders talked about options. 
There can be dozens or even hundreds of different options contracts on 
a single stock: the call options explained above; put options (described 
in the next section); different ‘strike prices’ (the ‘strike price’ of a call, 
for example, is the price at which the call’s holder has the right to buy 
the underlying shares); different expiry dates; etc. However, because—
as noted above—the Black–Scholes model has only one free parameter 
(the volatility of the underlying shares), it can be run ‘backwards’, so 
to speak, to find the level of volatility consistent with the price of an 
option—the ‘implied volatility’, as it came to be called. That made think-
ing and talking about options vastly easier: the dozens or hundreds of 
options on a given stock could all be compared on the single numerical 
dimension of implied volatility. Indeed, options traders soon came to 
talk about what they were doing as buying or selling volatility, not just 
buying or selling options. 
An example is the Chicago options-trading firm, O’Connor and 
Associates, set up in 1977. (Although little known outside the indus-
try, the firm was hugely influential in the evolution of the practice of 
modern mathematical finance.) As one of its traders said, ‘we would 
have a morning meeting, and [O’Connor manager Michael] Greenbaum 
would say, “The book isn’t long enough on volatility. We’re looking to 
buy some”, or “We bought too much yesterday. We’re looking to be less 
aggressive.”’22 Indeed, eventually, implied volatility—the key param-
eter of the Black–Scholes model—became tradable in its own right, in 
the form of futures contracts and exchange-traded funds based on the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange’s vix, its index of implied volatility.23
22 Michael Carusillo, interviewed by MacKenzie, Chicago, 7–8 November 2000. 
23 An exchange-traded fund or etf is a share designed so that its value tracks an 
index. For the vix and the etfs based on it, see MacKenzie, ‘Short Cuts’, London
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A second effect, harder to document, is the way in which the Black–
Scholes model helped options trading (which, as noted above, was long 
regarded as suspiciously close to gambling) gain legitimacy by connect-
ing it to the view, rapidly growing in influence in the 1970s and 1980s, 
that financial markets were efficient. When the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (cboe) opened in 1973, it was the world’s first organized 
exchange devoted exclusively to the trading of options, and the prede-
cessor of similar trading venues set up in Philadelphia, New York, San 
Francisco, London, Amsterdam and elsewhere. The cboe’s founders 
at the Chicago Board of Trade faced a long struggle to persuade regu-
lators to permit their new venture: one regulator compared options to 
‘marijuana and thalidomide’.24 The Board of Trade commissioned the 
economic consultancy, Nathan Associates, to build the case for options 
trading, and the firm in turn commissioned prominent academic econo-
mists to help it argue in its 1969 report that ‘the more strategies are 
available to the investor, the better off he is likely to be’.25
The work of Black and Scholes, which was still not fully completed at 
that point, was not drawn upon in the Nathan Associates’ report. By the 
mid 1970s, however, what Black, Scholes and Merton had done was seen 
by their fellow economists as a deeply insightful extension of the field’s 
‘efficient market’ reasoning. Burton Rissman, Counsel to the cboe, 
believes it was their work that finally banished the association of options 
with gambling:
Black–Scholes was really what enabled the [Chicago Board Options] 
Exchange to thrive . . . it gave a lot of legitimacy to the whole notions 
of hedging and efficient pricing, whereas we were faced in the late 60s–
early 70s with the issue of gambling. That issue fell away, and I think 
Black–Scholes made it fall away. It wasn’t speculation or gambling, it was 
efficient pricing.26
Review of Books, 25 January 2018. As discussed in that article, very considerable 
amounts of money had been bet on the vix remaining at a low level. On 5–6 
February 2018, there was huge turmoil in us financial markets when the vix 
suddenly soared and one of the main vehicles of that bet, an etf called the xiv, 
imploded. 
24 Joseph Sullivan, interviewed by MacKenzie, Knoxville, tn, 24 October 2000.
25 Nathan Associates, Public Policy Aspects of a Futures-Type Market in Options on 
Securities, Chicago 1969, vol. 2, p. 20.
26 Burton Rissman, interviewed by MacKenzie, Chicago, 9 November 1999. Not 
everyone was convinced: see, for example, Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism, 
Oxford 1986.
108 nlr 113
A third effect of the Black–Scholes model was on patterns of pricing. 
What can justifiably be asserted here needs, however, to be formulated 
with care. Certainly, there were instances in which the most crucial 
early material instantiations of the model—sheets of theoretical options 
prices, sold as a service to traders by Fischer Black—were used directly 
as price quotations.27 More generally, however, the model—which had 
never been entirely unitary (Black’s and Merton’s preferred derivations 
were different)—was added to and altered as it entered trading practice. 
Not only was it always necessary for traders to input a value for volatility 
before the model could generate a price, but also, for example, the speci-
fications of most of the contracts traded on the new options exchanges 
differed from those in the model’s canonical solution. (If the thesis of 
the performativity of economics is to have any validity, it cannot be a 
version of the discredited ‘linear model’ of technological innovation, in 
which scientific ‘discoveries’ are simply ‘applied’ to practice.) 
Furthermore, disentangling causality is made difficult by the fact that 
the publication and first uses in trading of the model coincided in time 
almost exactly with the opening of the cboe, at which point options 
changed from being simply ad hoc contracts sold by brokers (often to 
members of the general public), and became standardized contracts on 
an organized exchange on which professional traders could compete 
both to buy and to sell options. While the prices of options rapidly fell 
towards the kind of level that the model would suggest as appropriate, 
it is impossible to be certain how much of the fall was due to use of the 
model and how much to this change in market structure.28 
The feature of patterns of options prices that seems most likely to be 
related to the use of the Black–Scholes model concerns the crucial input 
to the model, volatility. In the logic of the model, this is a feature of the 
27 The financial economist Mark Rubinstein, interviewed by MacKenzie—Berkeley, 
ca, 12 June 2000—reports that when he became an options trader in San Francisco 
in 1976, Black’s sheets were being used in this way: ‘I walked up [to the most active 
options trading “crowd”] and looked at the screen [of price quotations] and at the 
sheet and it was identical. I said to myself, “Academics have triumphed.”’
28 Technically, options’ implied volatility came down to levels much closer to realized 
volatility. See Mixon, ‘Option Markets and Implied Volatility’. Mixon points out that 
‘the sharp decline [was] evident immediately upon the opening of the cboe’: p. 171. 
Although trading on the cboe was, as noted above, informed by the Black–Scholes 
model from the start, we tend to agree with Mixon’s view that the change in market 
structure was probably more important than the use of the model in this respect. 
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underlying shares, and therefore should not be affected by the specifics 
of options contracts, such as the ‘strike price’—the price at which an 
option gives the right to buy or to sell those underlying shares. Checking 
whether or not this was the case empirically was the central feature of the 
crucial early econometric tests of the model by the financial economist 
Mark Rubinstein, tests that the model broadly passed.29 But there may 
well be a crucial element of performativity here. When an options trader 
subscribed to Black’s pricing service, among the initial instructions he 
or she received was how to identify pairs of options on the same under-
lying shares whose implied volatilities were different, so that he or she 
could ‘spread’: buy the cheaper option (the one with the lower implied 
volatility), and sell the dearer.30 Trading in this way would of course have 
the effect of reducing discrepancies in implied volatility, thus—if our 
hypothesis here is correct—helping the Black–Scholes model pass its 
crucial econometric tests. 
i. gamma traps
Despite the many necessary caveats, we think that it is justifiable to talk 
of the use of the Black–Scholes model having effects on markets, among 
which were processes that changed the world in ways that, to put it very 
crudely, made the world ‘more like’ the model.31 A view of performativ-
ity, however, that focused only on these processes would be a dangerous 
one, and our argument in this article is that it is necessary to give at least 
equal weight to processes that have the opposite effect, that change the 
world to make it less like the model’s postulates—in other words, coun-
terperformative processes. Again, we take Black–Scholes as our first 
example, although the underlying issue is by no means restricted to that 
29 Mark Rubinstein, ‘Nonparametric tests of alternative option pricing models 
using all reported trades and quotes on the 30 most active cboe option classes from 
August 23, 1976 through August 31, 1978’, Journal of Finance 40, 1985.
30 Fischer Black, ‘The option service: An introduction’, 1975. Private papers of Mark 
Rubinstein.
31 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences certainly subscribed to this view, 
additionally attributing both generative power and positive societal influence to 
Black–Scholes–Merton: ‘Robert C. Merton and Myron S. Scholes have, in collabo-
ration with the late Fischer Black, developed a pioneering formula for the valuation 
of stock options. Their methodology has paved the way for economic valuations in 
many areas. It has also generated new types of financial instruments and facilitated 
more efficient risk management in society.’ Press Release, 14 October 1997. 
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model alone. As well as being directly used in trading in the ways just 
sketched, the model was also employed as the basis for a hedging prac-
tice called ‘portfolio insurance’. Consider what is called a ‘put option’. 
This is the right to sell an underlying asset at a set price. Imagine, for 
example, that a corporation’s shares are trading at $35. An investor in 
those shares could, for example, purchase a put option that gives her 
the right to sell them at $30. That can indeed be viewed as a form of 
insurance, limiting the losses that the investor will suffer if the shares 
plummet in price. Actually using put options in this way is expensive, 
considerably reducing investment returns. In 1976, however, the finan-
cial economist Hayne Leland of the University of California at Berkeley 
realized that rather than buying put options, investors could trade in 
such a way as to construct at least a passable version of the ‘replicating 
portfolio’ posited in the derivation of the Black–Scholes model as a per-
fect hedge for an option. If they did this, then they would enjoy a pattern 
of returns similar to those that would result from buying a put, without 
incurring the full expense of the latter. 
It was an attractive idea, and as share prices boomed during the 1980s, 
increasing numbers of institutional investors turned to the advisory firm 
that Leland helped to set up (and to other firms offering similar ‘portfo-
lio insurance’ services), to ‘lock in’ the gains they had made. Crucially, 
however, a Black–Scholes replicating portfolio is not a fixed thing, but 
needs to be adjusted continuously as the price of shares moves: again, 
recall that the underlying mathematics is Itô’s stochastic calculus. No 
portfolio insurer traded literally all the time—we concede, once again, 
to our Austinian critics that a fully fledged, literal Black–Scholes world 
cannot be created—but they did adjust their trading positions relatively 
frequently, often daily. 
The hedge required to keep synthesizing a put involves selling more and 
more of the underlying asset as its price falls. Hedging—a procedure 
designed to reduce risk—can trigger a self-reinforcing adverse spiral 
in the price of the underlying asset, a spiral that can create asset-price 
changes at odds with the model that informs the hedging. That pos-
sibility is the first form of counterperformativity that we identify in this 
article. It is not a danger restricted to put options or to the Black–Scholes 
model alone. As derivatives markets grew in scale from the 1980s 
onwards, the methodology underpinning Black–Scholes—identify a 
continuously adjusted portfolio of more basic assets that will replicate 
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the returns on the derivative, use the cost of the portfolio to price the 
derivative, and hedge the derivative using the portfolio—was applied to 
a wide variety of novel financial products. In the highly mathematical 
world of modern finance, even the phrase traders use to identify the 
danger is mathematicized. They talk of falling into a ‘gamma trap’, in 
which the hedging required by the model underpinning their deriva-
tives trading forces them to buy the underlying asset on an increasing 
scale as its price rises, or sell it as its price falls. ‘Implied volatility’ is 
by no means the only mathematical parameter that has entered trad-
ers’ parlance: because Greek letters are standardly used to denote these 
parameters, they are collectively known as ‘the Greeks’. ‘Delta’ is the 
first derivative (in the mathematical sense of the term ‘derivative’) of 
the price of an option or similar product with respect to the price of the 
underlying asset, and the value of delta determines the necessary size 
of the hedge. ‘Gamma’ is the second derivative, the rate at which delta 
changes—and thus the rate at which the hedge needs to change—as the 
price of the underlying asset moves. 
Events in financial markets that are probably the result of gamma traps 
seem far from unusual, even if rarely reported beyond specialist outlets 
such as Risk magazine: no journalist would welcome the task of having 
to explain ‘gamma’ to a general readership. There is, however, one cata-
clysmic episode that can be analysed as a gamma trap on a giant scale: 
the us stock market crash of October 1987. 
There are uncomfortable analogies to the current epoch: a right-wing 
President, tax cuts, a big expansion in government debt, an economic 
boom, and a stock-market surge accompanied by growing fears over 
its durability. That there was going to be a stock-price ‘correction’ was 
widely anticipated. The speed with which it happened, however, was not. 
On 19 October 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 22.6 per 
cent, its worst ever one-day fall, worse than even the most terrible days 
of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The more broadly based Standard & 
Poor’s 500 index fell 20 per cent, and the price of S&P 500 two-month 
index futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the instrument most 
widely used by portfolio insurers, fell 29 per cent.32 That last fall was 
grotesquely unlikely on the loglinear random walk model of share prices 
32 Jens Jackwerth and Mark Rubinstein, ‘Recovering Probability Distributions from 
Option Prices’, Journal of Finance, vol. 51, 1996.
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underpinning Black–Scholes: its probability was 10-160, as reported by 
the financial economists Jens Jackwerth and Mark Rubinstein.33 To the 
extent that the fall was exacerbated by a gamma trap in which portfolio 
insurers frantically sought to increase their hedges as prices fell, it was 
a counterperformative effect: a practice based upon the Black–Scholes 
model undermined the foundations of that model. 
Once again, the difficulties of establishing historical causation inter-
vene: it is hard to be certain, even in retrospect, just how much portfolio 
insurance contributed to the crash.34 What cannot be gainsaid, however, 
is the extent to which the events of that terrible Monday sparked fears 
of the collapse of the us financial system. For example, Hayne Leland 
reports his firm’s futures trader telling his bosses that day that if he tried 
to make all the sales that the synthesis of a put required he would simply 
make prices ‘go to zero’, perhaps even forcing the closure of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange and the stock markets to which it was linked. After 
the day’s trading on 19 October, staff of the Mercantile Exchange’s clear-
inghouse stayed up all night, desperately trying to achieve the transfers 
of funds necessary to balance the clearinghouse’s books and allow the 
Exchange to open on 20 October, a process that was completed, with only 
three minutes to spare, by what was in effect an emergency loan from the 
Continental Illinois Bank, verbally agreed in a phone call with the bank’s 
chair.35 The firms of ‘specialists’ that kept trading going on the New York 
Stock Exchange exhausted much of their limited capital on 19 October, 
and its chair John Phelan kept it formally open on 20 October—even 
though, in the absence of buyers, trading in most stocks had ceased—
only because he had received an appeal from the White House not to 
close, and privately feared that any closure would be permanent.36 
The trauma seems to have had enduring, possibly permanent, effects 
on the pricing of options. The period in which the Black–Scholes model 
broadly passed the econometric tests described above came to an abrupt 
33 Jackwerth and Rubinstein, ‘Recovering Probability Distributions’, p. 1612.
34 There is a reasonably balanced assessment in the most authoritative official report: 
Brady Commission, Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, 
Washington, dc 1998.
35 MacKenzie, An Engine, pp. 1–3. 
36 James Stewart and Daniel Hertzberg, ‘How the Stock Market Almost Disintegrated 
a Day after the Crash’, Wall Street Journal, 20 November 1987.
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end. Patterns of implied volatility—‘skews’ or ‘smiles’—inconsistent 
with the Black–Scholes model replaced the flat lines that the model pos-
ited, and those flat lines have not reappeared with the passage of time.37 
Why that is so is a complex question that cannot be addressed here, but 
let us reiterate the crucial point: to the extent that the 1987 crash was 
exacerbated by sales, informed by the Black–Scholes model, by portfo-
lio insurers, it was an episode of counterperformativity. The use of the 
model undermined central postulates of the model and did so in a way 
that appears permanent in its effects.38
ii. gaming
Viewed in the aftermath of the 2007–08 global banking crisis, the 1987 
crash seems a much less serious event than it appeared at the time. The 
Federal Reserve was able fairly quickly to convince market participants 
that it would make sufficient funds available to salvage key markets. In 
contrast, more than a decade on from 2007–08, the reverberations of 
the crisis of those years are still being felt. That many of finance’s math-
ematical models failed in 2007–08 is well-known. There was, in our 
view, a counterperformative process at work, but one that is of a differ-
ent kind from the hedging-driven ‘gamma trap’ mechanism described 
in the previous section. Because the overall contours of the crisis will 
be familiar to most readers, and it is not necessary to understand the 
details of the models in question to grasp the basic counterperformative 
process, we can be more schematic in this section of our article than in 
its predecessors.39 
37 Mark Rubinstein, ‘Implied Binomial Trees’, Journal of Finance, vol. 49, 1994.
38 When tests of the kind that had been conducted on data from the 1970s by Mark 
Rubinstein (in his ‘Nonparametric Tests’) were repeated after 1987, the perfor-
mance of the Black–Scholes model was much poorer. Instead of implied volatility 
being roughly similar for options on the same shares but with different strike 
prices (as should be the case on the Black–Scholes model), after 1987 characteris-
tic differences (which options traders refer to as the ‘volatility smile’ or ‘volatility 
skew’) appeared. The ‘smile’ or ‘skew’ does not imply, however, that traders never 
now use Black–Scholes: a common form of bricolage, for example, is still to use 
the model, but (in contradiction to the model’s original logic) to input, sometimes 
simply manually, different values of volatility for different strike prices.
39 As noted above, more detail can be found in MacKenzie, ‘The Credit Crisis’; 
MacKenzie and Spears, ‘The Formula’; MacKenzie and Spears, ‘A Device’.
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The mechanism of counterperformativity most central to the crisis was 
the ‘gaming’ of mathematical models employed for regulatory purposes, 
both public and private. In terms of public regulation, the crucial mod-
els were those mandated by regulators as means of determining the 
amounts of ‘equity’ capital—roughly speaking, equity is shareholders’ 
capital, although the matter is more complex than that—banks had to 
hold to back up their lending and the risks they took in their trading. 
If a bank incurs losses, those impact first on equity capital, and only if 
equity is exhausted should depositors, others who have lent the bank 
capital, and eventually tax payers have to bear losses. ‘Equity’ is thus the 
crucial risk-absorbing cushion. Banks’ senior managers dislike needing 
to have what they consider to be excessive amounts of equity, if only 
because a crucial metric of their success in the eyes of the stock market 
is their bank’s ‘return on equity’: its profits divided by its equity capital, 
a metric that is most easily enhanced by minimizing equity. So there 
was—there still is—an incentive to find ways of conducting risky but 
potentially profitable business that escapes, partially or completely, the 
mathematical models, insisted upon by regulators, that determine mini-
mum acceptable levels of equity. 
This process interacted fatally with a different, but structurally simi-
lar, process of ‘gaming’ models used for what is in effect private 
regulation by the credit-rating agencies. As their name implies, those 
agencies award ratings to borrowers (and financial instruments based 
upon borrowing): aaa for the most creditworthy; bbb for less solid 
but still ‘investment-grade’ borrowers; bb or lower for those deemed 
not to be investment-grade (‘junk’ in market parlance). Although the 
rating agencies fiercely defend the view that those ratings are simply 
opinions—seeking crucial First Amendment protections against law-
suits in the United States—ratings had regulatory force prior to 2008, 
a force diminished but not entirely eliminated by subsequent reforms. 
Many institutional investors, for example, were constrained by their 
mandates to hold primarily (or in some cases, exclusively) financial 
instruments rated investment-grade. Banking regulators also in effect 
outsourced some of their tasks to rating agencies, whose grades were 
an important input into the determination of necessary levels of equity. 
It is a truism of finance that expected return goes hand-in-hand with 
risk. The safe investment that genuinely promises high returns is a will-
o’-the-wisp; the riskier the borrower, the higher the rate of interest that 
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they can be charged, and—if all goes well—the greater the value of the 
loan. Again, this provides the incentive for gaming, in this case of the 
rating agencies’ models: if a financial instrument can be packed with 
risky loans, but still retain high credit ratings, it will become an attractive 
investment that will earn its constructors high fees. 
For much of the twentieth century, credit rating involved experienced 
human judgement being applied to relatively simple, familiar instru-
ments such as the bonds (i.e. the tradable debt) issued by corporations. 
From the 1980s onwards, however, far more complex ‘structured’ finan-
cial instruments became popular and required rating: mortgage-backed 
securities (mbss); other asset-backed securities (abss); and collateral-
ized debt obligations (cdos). With an mbs containing several thousand 
mortgages or a cdo containing the bonds or other debts of a hundred 
corporations, and with complexity growing fast (particularly impor-
tant to the 2007–08 crisis were abs cdos, in other words cdos whose 
component parts were tranches of abss), it was unsurprising that the 
rating agencies turned increasingly to mathematical modelling. Among 
the models they adopted, for example, was one already heavily used by 
banks to model cdos: the Gaussian copula.40 
Although the Gaussian copula had some of its roots in the Black–
Scholes model, it was not a model of the kind prized by the ‘quants’ 
who were energetically applying the Itô calculus in investment banking. 
The Gaussian copula nevertheless usefully served pragmatic purposes, 
and indeed became entrenched as the ‘market standard’ even when new 
models of the kind quants preferred became available. That a model has 
flaws, however, is not counterperformativity. The deeper issue, affect-
ing not just the Gaussian copula but also the quite different models 
employed to rate mortgage-backed securities, was that the rating agen-
cies made the details of the models they used public, and indeed allowed 
the constructors of mbss, abss and cdos simply to download those 
models in the form of software packages. 
40 Copula functions were introduced to mathematical statistics in the 1950s by the 
American statistician Abe Sklar, and were used to model, for example, the depend-
ence between the age distributions of risk of death of spouses (death of one partner 
tends to increase the risk of death of the other). A copula function ‘couples’ two 
or more distribution functions to form a joint distribution function. Employing 
a ‘Gaussian copula’ imposes the correlation structure of a multivariate normal 
distribution.
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Transparency is of course an oft-lauded modern virtue, but in being 
transparent in this way the rating agencies turned the construction 
of an mbs, an abs or a cdo into an optimization problem. The chal-
lenge became finding the highest-yielding package of debts (or, in the 
case of cdos, tranches of mbss, abss, or—eventually, in the later, most 
baroque phases of the process—even tranches of other cdos) that would 
nevertheless produce an instrument that could achieve the high ratings 
necessary for it to be sold profitably. Often, this was a trial-and-error 
process, involving repeated changes to the proposed pool of debts and 
rerunning the software. But computerized systems were also discreetly 
available that automated the optimization: two interviewees whom we 
cannot name helped construct such systems, one within a bank, the 
other as a commercial product. 
Hence counterperformativity. As we have already said, risk and return 
in finance go hand-in-hand. Finding the highest-yielding combination 
of debts that could achieve the desired ratings was tantamount to find-
ing the riskiest combination. Although the ratings profiles of mbss, 
abss and cdos remained broadly stable through time, the quality of the 
debts that made them up deteriorated. That in its turn fed back into the 
underlying process of lending, in a way familiar to anyone who has read 
Lewis’s The Big Short or seen the film based on it.41 (Viewers of the film 
may feel that it exaggerates for effect, but MacKenzie—whose interviews 
cover the events depicted—can testify that the flamboyant characters 
and reckless lending it portrays have a foundation in fact.)
The sharpest manifestation we have found of the counterperformative 
process at the heart of the global banking crisis is Table 1. It compares 
the assumptions about the default rates of subprime mortgage-backed 
securities built into the 2006 version of the rating agency Standard 
& Poor’s model for evaluating cdos with the subsequent actual rates; 
the latter, as the table shows, were around a hundred times the for-
mer. (The reason this is central to the crisis is that the resultant losses, 
which accumulated at the core of the global financial system, manifested 
themselves in the insolvency of many systemically important financial 
institutions.) It is easy to read that table and conclude that Standard & 
Poor’s model was simply wrong, but the 2006 assumptions were per-
fectly defensible in the light of experience before the bursting of the price 
41 Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine, London 2010.
bubble in the us housing market. Rather, our argument—our claim of 
counterperformativity—is that those assumptions made possible, via 
their gaming by market participants, the construction of securities that 
radically undermined them. 
iii. deliberate counterperformativity
In a stimulating contribution to the literature on performativity in eco-
nomic life, Elena Esposito points to the pervasiveness of what, drawing 
upon the social theory of Niklas Luhmann, she calls ‘second-order obser-
vation’.42 Translated into our terms, it is not simply that mathematical 
models in finance have performative and counterperformative effects, 
42 Elena Esposito, ‘The Structures of Uncertainty: Performativity and 
Unpredictability in Economic Operations’, Economy and Society, vol. 42, no. 1, 2013; 
Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, 2 vols, Stanford, ca 2012 and 2013.
Sources: column 1: Mark Adelson, ‘Bond Rating Confusion’, Nomura Securities research 
note, New York 2006; column 2: Erkan Erturk and Thomas Gillis, ‘Structured Finance 
Rating Transition and Default Update as of July 24, 2009’, Standard & Poor’s research note, 
New York 2009.
cdo Evaluator three-year default 
probability assumptions, as of 
June 2006 (per cent)
Realized incidence 












Table 1: Default probability assumptions versus realized incidence of default
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but actors observe or anticipate those effects and act accordingly. A recur-
ring suspicion that actors within finance have about the many models 
that involve the bell-shaped normal distribution, on which extreme 
events are very unlikely, is that their use can have the counterperforma-
tive effect of increasing the likelihood of those events. 
In the 1960s, when modern mathematical finance was gaining momen-
tum, a very different family of models was being advocated by the 
mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot. From his days as a student in Paris 
in the 1940s, Mandelbrot had self-consciously stood apart from the 
ambitious project, dominant in France and also influential elsewhere, 
rigorously to reconstruct the entirety of mathematics on the basis of a 
formalized theory of sets. The project—which even touched high-school 
mathematics in the form of the ‘new maths’ of the 1960s—was the work 
of a group of French mathematicians who adopted the collective pseu-
donym Nicolas Bourbaki. Mandelbrot claims he spent only one day as a 
student of the École Normale Supérieure in 1945: resigning after the first 
day because he saw that the ‘Bourbaki cult’ was taking over the school.43 
He wrote in his memoirs that his uncle, the Bourbaki member Szolem 
Mandelbrojt, was ‘upset and afraid’ by his nephew’s decision to change 
schools: ‘the way any fanatic, scientific purist fears new alloys’.44
‘I’m always ready to look at anything curious and bizarre’, Mandelbrot 
remarked.45 He was fond of an autobiographical synecdoche: when 
interviewed, he said that an important thread running through his 
work began with a book review he found in his uncle Szolem’s waste-
paper basket.46 The review was of George K. Zipf’s Human Behaviour 
and the Principle of Least Effort, which reported the multi-language word-
frequency distribution known as ‘Zipf’s law’, and sparked Mandelbrot’s 
persistent interest in what statisticians call ‘fat-tailed’ distributions: those 
in which the frequency of extreme events is far higher than in the well-
behaved normal distribution.47 What Mandelbrot was advocating in the 
43 Benoit Mandelbrot, The Fractalist: Memoir of a Scientific Maverick, New York 2012, 
pp. 92–3.
44 Mandelbrot, The Fractalist, pp. 92–3.
45 Benoit Mandelbrot, interviewed by Donald MacKenzie, Djursholm, Sweden, 
25 May 2002.
46 Mandelbrot interview, 25 May 2002.
47 George Zipf, Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least Effort: An Introduction to 
Human Ecology, Cambridge, ma 1949; Mandelbrot, The Fractalist, pp. 92–3. 
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1960s was a family of distributions identified by one of his teachers at the 
École Polytechnique, Paul Lévy. Lévy’s distributions are characterized by a 
parameter called alpha, which is always greater than 0 and no greater than 
2. The lower the value of alpha, the more fat-tailed the distribution. An 
alpha of 2 corresponds to the normal distribution, but if alpha is less than 
2 the tails of the distribution are sufficiently fat that the statistician’s stand-
ard ways of measuring a distribution’s spread (the ‘standard deviation’ or 
its square, the variance) are infinite: the integral-calculus expression that 
defines them does not converge, so they have no finite value. Mandelbrot 
was briefly a major influence on the University of Chicago economists 
developing the efficient-market view of finance, especially on the formu-
lator of the most explicit form of the efficient-market hypothesis, Eugene 
Fama.48 An infinite variance, however, renders standard econometric 
procedures inapplicable, and, after mainstream financial economics’s 
short-lived flirtation with Lévy distributions, it turned its back on them. 
It was therefore a considerable surprise to MacKenzie when in fieldwork 
in Chicago in 1999–2000 he found those distributions being used by the 
Options Clearing Corporation (occ). 
The occ occupies an utterly central position in options trading in the 
us: it is the clearinghouse for all exchange-traded options. When one 
trader or one algorithm sells an option, and another trader or algorithm 
buys that option, they do not enter into a contract with each other: each 
of them enters into a contract with the occ. If the occ were to fail—like 
the clearinghouse of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, occ was also 
in peril in the aftermath of the 1987 crash, with staff spending three 
successive nights awake in their offices, and with the Federal Reserve 
having to intervene to avert the bankruptcy of the occ’s leading mem-
ber firm, First Options—then organized options trading in the United 
States would collapse.49 
Clearinghouses such as the occ protect themselves from calamity by 
requiring what’s called ‘margin’. Options traders have to have money on 
48 See Eugene Fama, ‘Mandelbrot and the Stable Paretian Hypothesis’, Journal of 
Business, vol. 38, 1965. Philip Mirowski has documented Mandelbrot’s relations to 
mainstream economics in a series of articles including Mirowski, ‘From Mandelbrot 
to Chaos in Economic Theory’, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 57, 1990.
49 John Hiatt, interviewed by MacKenzie, Chicago, 7 November 2000. The Federal 
Reserve relaxed its capital requirements so that Continental Illinois Bank could 
recapitalize First Options.
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deposit at clearing firms such as First Options, and these firms in their 
turn have to deposit ‘margin’ with occ. In the event of adverse price 
movements, clearing firms and occ issue a ‘margin call’: a demand for 
an additional deposit. The level of margin is not set arbitrarily, but on the 
basis of a mathematical risk model. 
The occ had come to realize that a risk model based upon the assump-
tion of normal distributions could be counterperformative. Because, so 
to speak, a normal distribution does not ‘expect’ an extreme price move-
ment, if one occurs, the statistical estimator of the key parameter, the 
variance of the distribution, can suddenly soar. If that parameter deter-
mines the requirement for ‘margin’, the result will be a very large margin 
call, which in the words of an interviewee then at the occ can have ‘a 
secondary feedback effect that adds to the volatility’.50 Hence the ration-
ale of switching to a Lévy distribution with an alpha below 2 (painstaking 
econometric work by the occ—as noted, an infinite variance makes 
econometrics difficult—pointed to an alpha of around 1.65 being appro-
priate). Because a Lévy distribution of this kind ‘expects’ extreme events, 
when such an event happens, the estimators of its parameters do not 
change much, and margin requirements based on those estimators do 
not suddenly rise, so eliminating the feared ‘secondary feedback effect’. 
The choice of a Lévy distribution was thus informed by the hope of coun-
terperformativity: the goal of assuming a world in which catastrophe 
was a likely event was precisely to reduce the chances of catastrophe. 
Unlike our previous examples, in which counterperformativity was an 
unwanted effect, here it was actively desired.
Futures
We have no illusion that our three-fold categorization of counterperform-
ativity is complete: we expect that others can add to it, and hope that they 
will do. Nor do we for a moment intend that investigation of the perform-
ativity or counterperformativity of mathematical models should displace 
other forms of analysis of finance. For instance, the rise of options and 
other forms of derivatives cannot be understood in isolation from broader 
processes such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement and the 
rise of free-market economics and of deregulatory impulses. To take an 
example of a quite different kind, Chicago’s open-outcry trading pits were 
50 Timothy Hinkes, interviewed by Donald MacKenzie, Chicago, 8 November 1999.
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places of the body as well as of the use of Black’s sheets—and specifically 
places of male bodies, places often uncomfortable for women. The pat-
terns of interpersonal relations among options traders left their traces 
on price movements,51 and, more generally, the structures of financial 
markets—including the advantages enjoyed by incumbents—remain 
important, even in today’s world of algorithmic trading. The causes of 
the global financial crisis go far beyond the counterperformative process 
on which we have focused, and centrally include phenomena of the sort 
focused on by political economy of a more traditional kind, including 
Marxist political economy. As such, all we would claim is that ‘per-
formativity’ is a useful addition to the conceptual toolkit necessary for 
understanding economic life. Mathematical models are by no means the 
only phenomena that have a performative aspect, but they are ever more 
important. An algorithmic economy is an economy of logical operations 
and mathematical procedures, and therefore a mathematical economy.
Why ‘counterperformativity’, and not simply ‘performativity’? We have 
some sympathy with another set of critics of the application of the latter 
to economic life, of which Philip Mirowski is the most prominent.52 An 
analysis that neglected Derrida’s and Butler’s warnings, and focused 
only on cases of ‘successful’ performativity, might promote a renewed 
form of complacency, in which mathematical models—or, for exam-
ple, other forms of orthodox economics—are indeed seen as ‘working’ 
(albeit not because they begin as correct representations of the world, 
but because they have the power to change it). ‘Counterperformativity’, 
in contrast, highlights a necessary tension. A mathematical model 
can indeed be a powerful thing, but how it changes the world is 
inherently unpredictable.
51 Wayne Baker, ‘The Social Structure of a National Securities Market’, American 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 89, 1984.
52 See Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah, ‘Markets Made Flesh: Performativity, 
and a Problem in Science Studies, Augmented with Consideration of the fcc 
Auctions’, in MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu, eds, Do Economists Make Markets?
